This article discusses anthropology"s current mainstream understandings of development and offers a historical materialist alternative. According to these, development was and is either a discourse-backed anti-politics machine that strengthens the power of postcolonial governments or a category of practice, a universal that generates frictions when it clashes with local historical-cultural formations. The approach proposed here reintegrates the analysis of development into the anthropological analysis of capitalism"s uneven and contested histories and practices. A reassessment of World Bank reporting on Lesotho and an analysis of the Bank"s impact on the wider policies of development in postcolonial Mauritius, one of the 20 th century"s pre-eminent success stories of capitalist development, underlines that development is best understood as a political economy machinery that maintains and amends contested capitalist practices in an encounter with earlier global, national, and local historical-cultural formations.
Introduction -Development, History and Practice
When James Ferguson identified World Bank funded development programs in postcolonial Lesotho as an "anti-politics machine", he established a new paradigm in the anthropology of development (Ferguson 1990 ). His work revealed that a false history of isolation from global trade stood at the cradle of the World Bank"s production of knowledge about Lesotho. This was backed by a powerful Foucauldian discourse, a regime of truth that portrayed development in general and international organizations in particular as objective and neutral -programs and projects were supposedly dealing with technical issues and concerned with bettering the livelihoods of the inhabitants of a given place. This way, development could appear as something outside of the realm of politics. Unveiling that discourse, Ferguson showed how World Bank development projects in Lesotho failed to achieve their "official" aim and instead consolidated the nation state"s grip on a given region (Ferguson 1990:251-275) . In other words, World Bank and other international organizations" development programs in Lesotho and beyond were, to Ferguson, an anti-politics machine that produced political facts.
As happens with all paradigms, anthropologists have since pointed out the antipolitics machine"s limitations. Gerhard Anders, for example, argued that World Bank structural adjustment programs and their insistence on good governance in 1990s
Malawi (Anders 2005) did not strengthen but weakened the state. Tania Li"s anthropology of the Indonesian state"s domestic development programs puts emphasis on "the contingent and compromised space of cultural intimacy" as an important factor in any "attempt to constitute governable subjects" (Li 1999:295) . This extends into a critique of the anti-politics machine paradigm"s discursive approach, which is said to commit anthropology to an eternal search for development"s hidden motives (Li 2007) . In this spirit, anthropologists now emphasize that development as such and the programs and projects led by international and other institutions and organizations may well have good intentions. Development therefore should be researched from a supposedly more neutral angle, as a "category of practice". This, however, comes at the analytical cost of ignoring the unequal relations that development agendas thrive on. The new analyses of practice are supposed to reveal that, contrary to Ferguson"s paradigm, discourses are not all powerful but may, like any other structure of power, be manipulated and subverted (Mosse 2013) .
Development is now portrayed as one of several "engaged universals", which travel across "differences" and are thereby "charged and changed" due to the ubiquitous "frictions" that occur when universals hit the ground running. However, that new understanding is not particularly novel. Consider that a perspective, which claims that development agendas come into effect through processes that bereave them of their "promises of universality" (Tsing 2005:8) is very much in line with Ferguson"s antipolitics machine trope, where, likewise, the World Bank"s programs in Lesotho did not achieve the development agenda"s goal to improve local political economies but instead strengthened the national state"s grip on regions. What is more, the new anthropologies of development as a category of practice locate the process of friction in an interaction of development agendas "with historical-cultural formations of identity, rights, and development, which are then in turn "globalized" through advocacy chains" (Mosse 2013:232) .
Deliberately or not, there is an implicit reduction taking place here, which reintroduces hermeneutics of global (development as universalism) versus local (historical-cultural formations of identity, rights, and development) and, at the same time, confines the location of anthropological research to the scale of the local where universals become engaged. This replicates a general move in anthropology towards the Latourian paradigm of "keeping the social flat" by preempting global phenomena such as development of the very political economies that they emerge from and seek to alter or sustain (Murawski 2016; Kapferer 2005) .
The "historical-cultural formations" that this article is interested in, instead, are crucial for an anthropology of development that engages with and discloses how powerful development agendas always come in (global) plurals. No matter whether we look at the nineteenth century, the twentieth century, or the current century, any given group of humans always have more than one promise of universalism to refer to -not least when development is at stake. The period since the end of the Second World War, for example, saw the rise and decline of a number of capitalist development projects -moving from import-substitution to export-oriented development, the rise and decline of socialist development projects and the non-aligned movement"s calls for a new international economic order (the contributions in James and Leake 2015:
provide a good overview). All these global development agendas were about changing political economies and did put, for example, large-scale explicit industrial or infrastructural projects in place have sustained or reversed opportunities for accumulation and exploitation in a given region and/or nation.
Such large-scale programs and projects have far-reaching impact on human sociality. Collaboration, compliance and resistance as much as profit and impoverishment loom large when tens of thousands are dispossessed of their land This is the accepted version of an article published by Springer in Dialectical Anthropology Vol. 41 (2), 163-183. Published version available from: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10624-017-9450-0 Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/24181/ 4 while dams and other infrastructure constructed on that land may change the habitat of entire nation-states (Nilsen 2010) . Several decades of international and national development policies promoting industrialization have established tens of thousands of industrial estates and zones across the globe where hundreds of millions of workers are exploited each day while multinational corporations are incentivized to defy national social-contracts and avoid tax-payments (Neveling 2015a; Strümpell 2014) . At the same time, international organizations themselves are hardly homogenous blocs but employees, research groups, national delegations, and other individuals and groups usually hold different opinions on policies and may go headto-head over individual projects and programs (Shakya 2011) .
What is thus much needed is a perspective that replaces Ferguson"s anti-politics machine with a focus on the political economy machinery that development was and is. Section two develops the historical anthropology component of the political economy machinery paradigm. Ferguson"s findings that the World Bank misrepresented developing national economies as "aboriginal" and "isolated" rest on critiquing a single document, a 1975 World Bank report on Lesotho"s economy.
Section two reviews that document to show how Ferguson exaggerated certain World Bank statements and factored out the global context of the Cold War and decolonization. Once the global historical context is factored in, World Bank reporting no longer appears to fabricate historical isolation but to even reflect core demands of the non-aligned movement"s 1970s call for a new international economic order that should overcome unequal exchanges in the global economy. Building on these insights, I propose a critical anthropology of development that considers capitalism"s various spatial and temporal manifestations.
Section three applies this anthropology to a central but increasingly forgotten category of practicing development -reporting and survey mechanisms. The example of Mauritius, a small island in the Indian Ocean that was regarded as a hopeless case in the 1950s and became a best-practice example for successful capitalist development in the 1980s, brings to light how World Bank country reports and surveys were highly concerned with historical dependencies and the legacies of empire. Section four then shows that the most significant change in development policy, overcoming dependency on sugar as the single export-commodity with the opening of an export processing zone, was ushered in by historical-cultural formations from within Mauritius. This reveals how international and national actors and institutions, with roots sometimes stretching back over centuries, operated and negotiated development policies and related lending instruments in a multi-polar global arena.
The concluding section highlights that postcolonial development involves competing historical-cultural formations and that many of these globalized long ago. This establishes a new understanding of development as a category of contested capitalist practice, as one manifestation of the political economy machinery of capitalism and, hence, a struggle over maintaining power relations between capital, the nation-state and workers while changing the historical location of postcolonial economies and industrial sectors within dynamic regional and global political economies.
II. Development and Historical Isolation in Global Perspective
As stated above, Ferguson"s book on Lesotho is one of the most widely cited anthropological analyses of development. It"s first, and in many ways, foundational critique was that a 1975 World Bank report (co-sponsored by the UN"s Food and Agriculture Organization) falsely portrayed Lesotho"s economy as isolated and subsistence-based and thereby defined the rationale for dozens of development projects. As the anti-politics machine paradigm gained traction, anthropology came to regard fabricated histories as a standard feature of development discourse and practice even though Ferguson"s critique had a single World Bank report as empirical sample. Only recently, critiques have pointed out that the anti-politics paradigm overcommits anthropology to a constant search for hidden motives (Li 2007) . The following seeks to move beyond this impasse by re-reading Ferguson"s solitary empirical reference point and by adding an analytical perspective that considers the wider geopolitical setting of the 1970s, the competing global models for development of the time.
To Ferguson, the 1975 World Bank report misrepresented independent Lesotho as untouched by modern developments and as a "traditional subsistence" economy based on agriculture. Contrary to these World Bank findings, Lesotho was "a dormitory suburb of peasants who commute back and forth across the border" to work in South African mines (Wallman 1969 :5, cited in Ferguson 1990 . Also, the South African mining sector consumed a good share of Lesotho"s agricultural production. The World Bank, however, was committed to ignore Lesotho"s enclave status and its integration into a regional market because its mandate for development assistance required a focus on national economies. Images of "aboriginality" and "subsistence agricultural" further supported the requirement that the Bank regarded its member-states and clients as neutral, enlightened postcolonial nation-state guided by the principle of "governmentality" and aiming at a "great transformation" towards industrialization (Ferguson 1990:71-73) .
A re-reading of the 1975 World Bank report reveals, however, that this was, from the preamble onward, very explicit about Lesotho"s historical conditions and regional integration. In regard to labor migration it stated, for example, that "[a]t present an estimated 60 percent of the male labor force is in South Africa" (World Bank 1975:xv) . Further, the report devoted considerable attention to the history of migration, to wage differences between the two countries and to the social costs of labor migration, which had "disrupted family lives" in Lesotho. Somewhat culturalist undertones, such as the ahistorical statement that migration to the mines in South Africa had "penetrated into Lesotho culture" (World Bank 1975:xv) , were specified with reference to class as the World Bank reporters underlined that poorer families were much more likely than rich families to send out migrants. Overall, the report was very attentive to the fact that migration was of "critical economic importance" and Ferguson not only misinterpreted the report"s take on migration. His diagnosis of fabricated histories of "aboriginality" and "traditional subsistence" agriculture in the report rested on declaring that the World Bank surveyors had ignored regional integration of Lesotho"s agriculture in the early 1800s and that they had identified a significant decline in agricultural production for the period from 1950 to 1970 based on flawed statistics.
First, regarding Ferguson"s comment on the use of statistics, it is important to note that this refers to secondary literature, which identified the 1949/50 colonial census of the Maize crop as an anomaly -an exceptionally good harvest or wrongly calculated (Ferguson 1990:50) . Such evidence is insufficient to nullify the Bank"s overall concern with a declining agricultural output, however. If the 1949/50 census was flawed, the fact remains that absolute maize production in 1970 was only 50 percent of the 1960 output. Also, yield per acre in Lesotho declined for all crops (and not only for maize) from 1950 to 1970. Last but not least, the Bank report dated these issues back to the 1930s when the colonial government had first worried about soil erosion (World Bank 1975:38 (Ferguson 1990:33) . Considering the Bank"s attention to the history of migration and to soil erosion dating back to the 1930s, such evidence appears to be circumstantial at best. The issue of fabricated historical isolation in the Bank report that undergirds the anti-politics paradigm appears even more misconceived once we re-read the report with a focus on the global political setting and the global political economy of the 1960s and 1970s. For those were the years when the green revolution in agriculture introduced fertilizers and pesticides across the globe, when famines had ravaged across parts of the Soviet Union, the People"s Republic of China, Bangladesh and across Africa and when the world food crisis of the early 1970s had introduced the Western industrially advanced nations to the fragility of global commodity chains (Wemheuer 2014; Gerlach 2008) . In some ways, these global crises already featured prominently in the anthropological literature of the time -think of Marshall Sahlins analysis of how US-Americans rejected on moral grounds to consume horse meat in times of shortages even though it was a central component of the canned food they fed their dogs (Sahlins 1976) - and it seems rather pertinent that the Bank would address issues in Lesotho"s agricultural sector and couple these with rapid population growth.
Beyond their individual profundity, Ferguson"s misrepresentations of the World Bank report point to methodological issues in the way the anti-politics machine paradigm addresses the historical integration of a given region into global processes. Put simply, the historical scope put forward to object to the World Bank"s invention of Lesotho"s economic isolation could be invoked to deconstruct any effort to change any nation"s positioning in the global economy -for any such nation"s territory will have had periods of full integration into regional trade at some point in its history. (Edelman and Haugerud 2005:41) . In response to this bi-polar world order, those nations developed their own project for development in the nonaligned movement (NAM), which culminated in the campaign for a new international economic order (NIEO) in the 1960s and 1970s. One core demand was to alter the terms of global trade, which allowed former colonial powers to buy raw materials from their former colonies cheaply, manufacture them into finished goods and sell those back at a high profit margin (Murphy 1984) . The NIEO list of demands further included financial support for setting up manufacturing industries, sovereignty over natural resources, and the obligation for multi-national corporations to comply with national laws and labor standards. United Nations" agencies such as the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) were founded due to political pressure from the NAM (Neveling 2017) , leading neoliberal think tanks attacked the NIEO initiative (Bair 2009 ) and, somewhat ironically, aggravated exploitation in export processing zones spread the support of UNIDO (Neveling 2015a ). The World Bank was not in favor of the NIEO initiative, but it was impossible for the Bank to ignore it in the 1960s and 1970s (Sharma 2015) .
As the publication of the World Bank report on Lesotho in 1975 came at the peak of the NIEO initiative"s global influence, the Bank surveyors" attention to the plight of migrant laborers and their families, to the issue of soil erosion and to the need for manufacturing industries should be analyzed considering the global political disjunctures sketched above. Given that Ferguson labeled the anti-politics machine paradigm as discourse analysis in Michel Foucault"s tradition and given that to Foucault historical research was central for uncovering the emergence of discursive regimes (Foucault 2008) , it seems rather surprising how Ferguson fronts Lesotho"s grain reserves and exports in 1837 but shows no interest in Lesotho"s positioning within the histories of competing development discourses and practices (Ziai 2015) .
In other words, Ferguson"s claim that if a given region was integrated into a larger regional economy in 1837 it could not be viewed as isolated in 1975, may be considered as a fabrication of history as well for it seeks to refute (alleged) ahistorical claims to isolation and aboriginality with an ahistorical declaration of integration and connectivity.
Instead, a critical anthropology of development needs to link discourse and practice in history and make use of the methods and analytical concepts at hand to enquire about the changing incorporation of a given postcolonial nation into a larger system. One proposal along these lines is to consider that capitalism"s drive to maintain rates This is the accepted version of an article published by Springer in Dialectical Anthropology Vol. 41 (2), 163-183. Published version available from: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10624-017-9450-0 Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/24181/ 9 of profit means that all related economic activities either face the problem of exhausted resources (e.g. soil erosion) or the problem of growing organizational power of the exploited in a given region (Silver 2003) . Partly in response to these historical limits of accumulation and coupled with a drive towards expansion that establishes competing sites of production for the same commodities in different regions and thereby encourages relocation, capitalism on a global scale means regional oscillation of development and underdevelopment -a "geographical seesaw" that over the past several hundred years has moved regions from the periphery to the semi-periphery or to the center of capitalist accumulation and in the opposite direction (Smith 2010) . With these principles in mind and with awareness that the anti-politics machine paradigm ignores the wider, historical political economic setting in which development as a political project unfolds in each time and in each space, the following proposes by example a critical anthropology of development that focuses on the global and historical intricacies of World Bank reporting and development policies.
III. From Anti-Politics Machine to Political Economy Machinery
A first step for such a critical anthropology of development is to consider the institutional and contractual framework between the World Bank and its member states and to couple this consideration with the historical conditions under which survey missions are commissioned, reports produced, loans recommended and approved and development projects and technical assistance initiated and executed.
Mauritius shall serve as case study here. While Mauritius and Lesotho differ in considerable ways they also share important similarities. Lesotho is landlocked as an enclave within South African territory whereas Mauritius is, say, sea-locked in the Indian Ocean with hundreds of kilometers distance to the likewise small-island economies of Reunion and Madagascar. Both nations were British colonies and gained independence in 1966 (Lesotho) and 1968 (Mauritius), respectively. Further, both nations had similar demographics at independence (below 1 million), had an established, yet mostly unemployed industrial workforce at the time and embarked on development policies aiming for economic diversification from export agriculture into export-oriented manufacturing (Murray 1980; Neveling 2012 ).
Other than in Lesotho, World Bank documentation on Mauritius began in the colonial period already. First came a report entitled "The Economy of Mauritius", published on September 10, 1963 (World Bank 1963a . This difference of twelve years between the Bank"s first report on Mauritius and its first report on Lesotho is explained by institutional logic and conditions of contract. The Bank needed an "invitation" to survey a national or colonial territory. Such an invitation was commonly the first request for a project loan from a given political unit with member status in the Bretton 1973a, 1973b, 1982a, 1987) .
Applications for individual loans, such as that for the power plant and supply lines,
were assessed on a case-by-case basis. Staff Appraisal Reports were based on field missions. These commonly included visits to project sites, interviews with stakeholders such as government ministries, development agencies, and local corporations. A positive Staff Appraisal Report was the basis for a written recommendation of the Bank"s President to a committee deciding on loan approval. If approved, a contract between the parties was signed and filed. After project completion, a final report was published. annexes, three of which were devoted to sectors ("The Sugar Industry in Mauritius", "The Power Sector", "The Manufacturing Sector"), and one on "The Development of
Human Resources" (World Bank 1978a , 1978b , 1978c , 1978d . In 1980, a 234-pages "Mauritius. Recent Economic Developments and Future prospects"
followed and added an analysis of the transport sector to the Bank"s surveys (World Bank 1980b , 1980a .
Reporting continued throughout the 1980s, but by then the tone had been set for how the World Bank depicted Mauritian historical integration into the global system. When and hostile take-overs and the surviving corporations were large conglomerates with ties of friendship, kinship, and joint shareholdership to major African multi-nationals of the day (Neveling 2012 (Neveling , 2013 Salverda 2015) .
In the 1960s, Mauritius was thus an island with a long history of capitalist development, ranging from rather general economic strategies and efforts of the 1800s to conscious planning and funding of new industrial activities since the 1930s.
Many local institutions had emerged in the process and had been actively involved in this. Such institutions had regional and sometimes global networks, some of which stretched back over centuries. On top of this, 1950s and 1960s Mauritius was bustling with private clubs, secret societies and rackets, from Rotarians to Freemasons, while many Mauritians from the higher ranks of the state bureaucracy and from the economic elite had attended universities in the UK, France, and the US. There is neither an external institution imposing its agenda on a small-island postcolonial nation nor is there a single agenda on the global or on the national level.
The challenge for a critical anthropology of development is to elaborate an encounter of several global development agendas -some of which had colonial legacies while others had early neoliberal legacies. The question then is further what difference lesser or stronger historical depth meant for the higher impact in the 1960s.
That question of impact is important not least because it adds to our understanding why the Mauritian alliance of a landed colonial bourgeoisie in the sugar sector and an emerging political ruling class could take the initiative for changing national development policies and take the World Bank along. The first postcolonial Mauritian government turned to the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), an agency that had emerged from the NAM initiative in 1966 and was keen to establish itself as a major player in the global development circuits of the 1970s and 1980s. In 1969, UNIDO"s published the recommendations of a technical assistance mission that had assessed the feasibility of establishing an EPZ in
Mauritius. This was a win-win situation as it helped complete the Mauritian EPZ planning phase while it helped UNIDO advertise its services to other postcolonial nations now that one mission had been commissioned and succeeded when the EPZ was opened in 1970 (Neveling 2015b (Neveling , 2017 .
The involvement of UNIDO in EPZ planning underlines that the World Bank was only significantly. An enlarged board of twelve directors now gave the instigators of the EPZ, the Mauritian private sector, a majority of seven over five government representatives (World Bank 1974a:7-8) .
At the end of that short maneuver, the World Bank and the Mauritian private sector controlled millions of US-dollars of public debt and disbursed that debt to build infrastructure and grant investment incentives to an increasing number of joint ventures between Mauritian and foreign corporation operating in the EPZ. Mauritian EPZ workers instead lived through years of highly exploitative and abusive labor relations while the governments they elected kept applying for more World Bank loans to build more industrial zones and grant more incentives to EPZ investors.
At the end of the 1970s, the Mauritian state was approaching bankruptcy, not least because World Bank loans channeled towards the DBM could no longer be repaid. This does not preclude that the political economy machinery of development always generates something that works in favor of capitalism and prevents outright conflict.
What is important is that an analysis of the encounter between the synchronic and diachronic dimensions of competing capitalist practices engaging in the political economic machinery that is development turns our attention to the fact that some of the most powerful, most world-making historical-cultural formations involved in development are majorly concerned with capitalist exploitation. Development thus emerges as one manifestation of capitalism"s political economy machinery that is indeed best studied as a category of contested practice.
